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The Anti-Gender Movement in Europe and the 
Educational Process in Public Schools
Roman Kuhar*1 and Aleš Zobec2
• Mass protests across Europe against marriage equality, reproductive 
rights, gender mainstreaming and sexual education have centralised 
in the past few years around so-called “gender theory”. This theory is 
explained as a new threat to the “traditional family” and “natural mas-
culinity and femininity”, as it allegedly aims at cultural revolution: a 
post-binary gender world. Many of these debates (and concrete actions) 
are targeted at schools and the educational process. It is believed that 
“gender theory” is already being taught in schools, which will have det-
rimental consequences for pupils. Agents of the anti-gender movement 
claim that children are being sexualised and brainwashed by “gender 
theory”.
 Taking this debate as the starting point, we first examine the roots of 
the term “gender theory” and point to its nature as an “empty signi-
fier”. We then analyse the types of anti-gender actions across Europe 
that interfere with the educational process in public schools. Finally, we 
consider the role of parents and their right to intervene (or not) in the 
educational process. On the basis of the existing rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights, we argue that the provision that parents are 
entitled to educate their children in accordance with their religious and 
moral beliefs does not mean that teachers in schools should avoid issues 
that might “morally distress” pupils or their parents, as long as schools 
avoid indoctrination, and providing the topics (like any other topics) are 
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.
 Keywords: gender theory, gender ideology, public schools, educational 
process 
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Gibanje proti “teoriji spola” v Evropi in izobraževalni 
proces v javnih šolah
Roman Kuhar in Aleš Zobec
• Množični protesti po Evropi proti istospolnim porokam, reproduk-
tivnim pravicam, politiki gender mainstreaming in spolni vzgoji so se v 
zadnjih letih osrediščili okrog tako imenovane »teorije spola«. Razume-
jo jo kot novo grožnjo »tradicionalni družini« ter »naravni moškosti in 
ženskosti«, ker naj bi domnevno vodila v kulturno revolucijo – v postbi-
narni spolni svet. Veliko teh razprav (in konkretnih akcij) je usmerjenih 
v šolski prostor in izobraževalni proces. Akterke_ji teh protestov trdijo, 
da se »teorija spola« že poučuje v šolah, kar naj bi imelo škodljive pos-
ledice za učenke_ce. Prav tako trdijo, da »teorija spola« otroke v šolah 
seksualizira in jim pere možgane.
 Razpravo o »teoriji spola« v tem članku postavljamo v izhodišče naše 
razprave in najprej pokažemo na izvore tega termina, ki ga razumemo 
kot prazni označevalec. Nato analiziramo tipe intervencij akterk_jev tega 
gibanja v šolski prostor javnih šol v Evropi ter nazadnje razpravljamo o 
vlogi staršev in njihovi pravici, da posegajo (ali ne) v izobraževalni pro-
ces. Na osnovi obstoječih sodb Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice 
trdimo, da pravica staršev, da svoje otroke vzgajajo skladno s svojimi ver-
skimi in moralnimi prepričanji, ne pomeni, da naj se učiteljice_i v šolah 
izogibajo temam, ki bodo mogoče »moralno pretresle« učenke_ce ali nji-
hove starše, dokler se šole pri obravnavi teh tem izogibajo indoktrinaciji 
in so te teme (ali katere koli druge) prikazane na objektiven, kritičen in 
pluralen način.
 Ključne besede: teorija spola, ideologija spola, javna šola, vzgojni 
proces 
c e p s  Journal | Vol.7 | No2 | Year 2017 31
Introduction
In the recent years – particularly since the mass protests by Manif pour 
tous in France against marriage equality in 2013 – an increasing number of 
groups and initiatives have been organised in resistance to what previously 
appeared to be an irreversible process of achievement of gender equality and 
sexual rights in the Western world (but also elsewhere). Their targets include 
anything from marriage and gender equality, abortion, reproductive rights, sex 
education, gender mainstreaming and transgender rights, to antidiscrimina-
tion policies and even the notion of gender itself. The basic idea that connects 
all of these actors is the notion of “gender theory” or “gender ideology”,3 which 
functions as an empty signifier (Mayer & Sauer, 2017), as symbolic glue (Kováts 
& Põim, 2015), or simply as a multi-purpose enemy, which can be shaped in dif-
ferent ways to fit into the concrete goal of a political protest. 
This resistance across Europe should not be understood merely as a con-
tinuation of previous forms of (conservative) opposition to the human rights 
pertaining to intimate (Plummer, 2003) and sexual citizenship (Richardson, 
2000) policy debates; they are new manifestations of resistance, shaped by 
new forms of organisation, new types of mobilisation and new discourses that 
seek to address wider audiences and not only traditional circles of conservative 
groups. 
Despite the fact that the term “gender theory” has emerged only re-
cently, its ideological background has been in the making since the mid 1990s, 
primarily in the context of the Roman Catholic Church. As shown by recent 
investigations into the roots of the anti-gender movement, the Vatican has been 
instrumental in manufacturing the notion itself and in spreading it around Eu-
rope and globally (Paternotte, 2015). 
One of the most important targets of the anti-gender movement in Eu-
rope is public schools and the educational process. It is believed that “gender 
theory” has “leaked” into public schools and that pupils are being sexualised 
and brainwashed by radical feminist ideology and homosexual propaganda. 
For these reasons, groups of concerned parents are being organised across Eu-
rope to protest against the alleged infringement of their right to educate their 
children in accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions (Pa-
ternotte & Kuhar, 2017b).
 Taking these developments as the starting point, the aim of the present 
article is threefold. First, we examine the emergence and interpretation of the 
term “gender theory” and why it has such a strong mobilising effect. We then 
3 Both terms are used by anti-gender activists. In this article we use them interchangeably. 
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discuss the types of protests anti-gender movements across Europe use to pro-
test against “gender theory” in the educational process in public schools. These 
two sections are based on a research project comparing these movements in 
twelve European countries, carried out between 2014 and 2017 (Kuhar & Pa-
ternotte, 2017). The research focused on a critical analysis of the movement’s 
discourse, mobilisation strategies and actors. Empirically, it was based on an 
analysis of the movements’ webpages, public statements and debates, leaflets, 
media articles, YouTube videos, etc. in each national context.4
Finally, we consider the role of parents and their right to intervene (or 
not) in the educational process when “difficult topics” such as gender equality 
or sexuality are discussed. In reality, these protests are not a totally new phe-
nomenon: parents have complained about certain topics – particularly sex edu-
cation – in the past, with some of the cases ending up at the European Court of 
Human Rights. What is new is the magnitude of the protests, such as the French 
or Italian appeals to “concerned parents” to keep their children out of school 
for a day in order to protest against “gender theory”. Such protests put immense 
pressure on school authorities and on teachers themselves. 
Despite the aforementioned differences, we believe that the existing 
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights are still a valid interpreta-
tion of Article 2 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1952), which compels the State to “respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions”.
On the basis of an analysis of these rulings, we will argue that the pro-
vision that parents are entitled to educate their children in accordance with 
their religious and moral beliefs does not mean that teachers in schools should 
avoid issues that might “morally distress” pupils due to their particular value 
system. In this sense, public schools and especially teachers – while respecting 
the particularities of value systems – should strongly commit to the framework 
of shared values and norms that derive from human rights and should prevent 
mass populist attempts of anti-gender movements to intervene in the educa-
tional process.
4 We are indebted to the following researchers: Austria (Stefanie Mayer and Birgit Sauer), Belgium 
(Sarah Bracke, Wannes Dupont and David Paternotte), Croatia (Amir Hodžić and Aleksandar 
Štulhofer), France (Michael Stambolis-Ruhstorfer and Josselin Tricou), Germany (Paula-Irene 
Villa), Hungary (Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető), Ireland (Mary McAuliffe and Sinead Kennedy), 
Italy (Sara Garbagnoli), Poland (Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk), Russia (Kevin Moss), 
Spain (Monica Cornejo and J. Ignacio Pichardo).
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The roots of “gender theory”
In January 2013, France saw one of the largest protests in recent his-
tory. According to some estimates, nearly one million people protested against 
the French government, which had opened up the institution of marriage for 
same-sex couples. Some of the protesters held banners saying “Stop gender” 
or “Stop gender ideology”. The notion of “gender ideology” was seen as a sym-
bol of a moral crisis, represented by the fact that same-sex couples are treated 
equally to opposite-sex couples. However, “gender ideology” – which is in some 
countries worded as “gender theory” or, primarily in German-speaking coun-
tries, as “genderismus” (in an allusion to “kommunismus”) – represents much 
more than just resistance to marriage equality. As it is never clearly defined, its 
meaning is slippery. As such, it creates the impression of a conspiracy theory 
and functions as an “empty signifier” (Mayer & Sauer, 2017) that can represent 
everything and anything from marriage equality and sexual education to repro-
ductive and adoption rights and abortion.
The emergence of the notion of “gender theory” and the related discourse 
can be traced back to developments after the 1994 UN Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo and the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 
1995. At that time, the term “gender” started to emerge in the official documents 
of these conferences, replacing the more essentialist term “sex”, in order to show 
that gender non-equality is not a result of biological differences, but rather pri-
marily of socially constructed differences between genders (Buss, 2004). 
During these conferences, however, the Holy See expressed explicit res-
ervations about the term “gender” and insisted that the final documents of both 
conferences use the term “sex”. For the Holy See, gender, or the idea that male 
and female are socially constructed categories, goes against their ideas of the 
“natural family” in which both man and woman have their own distinct roles, 
as defined by their biological differences (primarily in terms of reproduction) 
(ibid., 2004). For these reasons, the Vatican tried to promote the idea of “equal 
dignity” of men and women, rather than equal rights regardless of gender 
(i.e., gender equality). Such an interpretation is built on John Paul II’s theol-
ogy, which insists on sexual differences between men and women and on their 
complementarity. Similarly, Cardinal Ratzinger lamented the “trivialisation of 
sexual differences” as early as in 1985 (Paternotte, 2015).
In the aftermath of both conferences, the first discussions on gender as a 
hidden plan of radical feminists and LGBT activists emerged. Gender was inter-
preted not only as a social construction of the sexes, but also as a “strategic tool” 
to establish a post-gender society that would either dismiss the importance of 
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gender or would establish a gender order that goes beyond the binary gen-
der system. These authors – such as American pro-life journalist Dale O’Leary 
(1997), French priest and psychoanalyst Tony Anatrella (2015) and later Ger-
man sociologist Gabriele Kuby (2016) – all claimed that gender aims to destroy 
masculinity and femininity, to go beyond the “natural complementarity of men 
and women” and consequently to destroy the “natural family”. These interpreta-
tions are still at the core of what was later termed “gender theory”, which is now 
understood to be the ideological paradigm of more or less any gender equality 
and sexual citizenship policies (Paternotte, 2015).
“Gender theory” started to catch on as a new buzzword and received 
mainstream attention around 2012 and 2013, particularly during the French pro-
tests of Manif pour tous. Similar resistance had, however, occurred before, such as 
the protests against marriage equality in Spain in 2005, followed by the so-called 
Family Day in Italy in 2007, which was organised to protest against the Italian 
government’s intention to adopt civil partnership legislation (DiCo) for same-
sex couples. Later, the “family day” became one of the protesting structures of 
anti-gender movements around Europe. Slovenia saw such protests against the 
new Family Code, including a Family Day, in 2010. In Croatia, protests against 
the sex education module took place around the same time. In Poland, the “gen-
der ideology” debate emerged around deliberations on gender violence and the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention, while in Slovakia gender was one of the 
key words during their referendum campaign in 2015 on the definition of the 
family and the rights of same-sex couples (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017a).
During all of these protests, “gender theory” became denounced as the 
main ideological base of all of these progressive policies. In other words, “gen-
der theory”, alluding to the idea that there is a coherent body of scientific work 
known as “gender theory” (which is not the case), became a synonym for some 
kind of conspiracy theory, aiming at a cultural revolution in which biological 
facts about men and women will be denied and fluidity of gender will be pro-
moted. “Gender theory” is therefore constructed as a project of social engineer-
ing where men are no longer masculine and women are no longer feminine and 
one is free to choose one’s own gender and sexual orientation, even “several 
times a day” (Cestnik 2013; Debevec 2015; Hodžič & Bijelić, 2014).
Some Catholic intellectuals, such as Tony Anatrella (2015), claim that 
“gender ideology” is a new leftist ideology, which has succeeded Marxist ideol-
ogy. The battle no longer exists “in the relation between the bourgeoisie and 
the capital against the working class, but rather in the relation between men 
and women” (Strehovec, 2013, p. 238). Primarily in the context of Eastern Eu-
rope, “gender ideology” is often explained as a neo-colonial project in which 
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the decadent West seeks to impose its gender delusion upon the rest of the 
world (Graff & Korolczuk, 2017b). This is one of the populist strategies of the 
anti-gender movement to revive the unpleasant memories of former totalitar-
ian regimes. Polish Bishop Pieronek, for example, claimed “Gender ideology is 
worse than communism and Nazism put together” (Graff & Korolczuk, 2017a).
The term “gender theory” increasingly became a matter of fact: it was 
picked up by the mainstream media, politicians refer to it in their political 
speeches – either to denounce it or to frame their arguments in line with “gen-
der theory” argumentation – and eventually it also became a household word 
among the general population. As it is simplistically explained as a theory that 
goes against the common-sense understanding of sex as a biological category, 
it counts on people’s deeply rooted anxieties about (homo)sexuality and gen-
der roles, thus creating the desired populist effect: aversion, but also anger and 
moral panic. 
The most fascinating aspect of this phenomenon is that the “boring 
scientific-sounding term” of “gender theory” has been able to become such a 
strong and effective mobilising tool. This can be partly explained by the fact 
that “gender theory” is said to be a product of the ruling elites. Just like “gen-
der theory”, elites function as an empty signifier, representing either politicians, 
feminists, LGBT activists or just anyone who struggles for gender equality. 
These groups are seen as corrupt elites, who are producing such ideas in the 
ivory towers of universities and (trans)national political structures, and are en-
tirely detached from ordinary people. 
The fact that most of the aforementioned protests took place during the 
economic crisis, in the face of strict austerity measures and the rise of pop-
ulism in Europe, helped strengthen the perception of a gap between elites and 
ordinary people. The movement is successful because it appeals – much like 
the populist parties and groups around Europe (Lazaridis et al., 2016) – to the 
anxieties of people about the future of their family, and particularly their chil-
dren. The “innocent child” is at the centre of the anti-gender discourse, which 
is based on what Wodak (2015) calls the “politics of fear”.
With its focus on corrupt elites, the anti-gender movement has provided 
people with the promise of a better future. The future, however, is in the past: 
our societies, they claim, should return to the natural order of things, whereby 
men are men and women are women and both are equally respected, but are 
not equal. 
The anti-gender movement includes actors who go beyond religious af-
filiations. In fact – as stressed by Kováts and Põim (2015) – the movement is a 
symbolic glue that makes cooperation between different actors possible, despite 
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the differences in their basic ideological framework. At the core of “gender ideol-
ogy” as a glue that links and unites as diverse actors as family associations, pro-
life groups, some religious gay actors and radical nationalist parties, is the image 
of the “innocent child”, and consequently family and nation. Furthermore, the 
joint actions of these actors are inspired by the same target: corrupt elites whose 
(gender) ideology is constructed as a new totalitarian ideology that aims to de-
stroy masculinity and femininity, to go beyond the natural complementarity of 
men and women, thus weakening the basis of the “natural family” and, by con-
sequence, the nation itself (Hodžič & Bijelić, 2014; Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017b).
Groups and actors who are united in their struggle against “gender ide-
ology” find gender to be a common, unifying ground, as gender is constructed 
as an attack on either nature (religious actors), nation (nationalistic actors) or 
normality (conservative actors). Despite some convergences between the ac-
tors, these are the main distinct entrance points for anti-gender groups. In 
other words, “gender ideology” is a common framework that squeezes different 
discourse into one big threat to which different actors can connect (Paternotte 
& Kuhar, 2017b). 
The anti-gender movement presents itself as modern, young and hip. In 
most cases, the movement tries to hide its religious connections and create a 
secularising self-image that cannot be reduced to previous forms of conserva-
tive resistance against gender equality and sexual rights. They also increasingly 
create international coalitions, such as in the case of the European citizens’ ini-
tiative to protect marriage and the family: Mum, Dad & Kids.5 
The anti-gender movement and public schools
One of the important targets of the anti-gender movement is knowledge 
production. This is a struggle over the legitimacy of academic work, particu-
larly of gender and related studies. In Poland (Graff & Korolczuk, 2017a) and 
France (Stambolis-Ruhstorfer & Tricou, 2017), but also elsewhere, gender de-
partments and gender studies courses at universities have been attacked and 
denounced as nests of “gender ideology” and non-scientific work. Gender stud-
ies are criticised as being non-academic, ideological and in conflict with the 
allegedly unquestionable findings of biology, such as differences between male 
and female brains. The anti-gender movement therefore has ambitions to be-
come an alternative field of knowledge production. 
Similarly, one of the targets of the anti-gender movement in Europe 
is public schools, which are said to already include “gender theory” in their 
5 Initiative Mum, Dad and Kids, see: http://www.mumdadandkids.eu/.
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curricula. Different types of actions have been organised to resist teaching on 
gender equality in schools. Civil initiatives of so-called “concerned parents” 
have tried to put pressure on school authorities and teachers to not address cer-
tain topics, such as same-sex families, the social construction of gender roles, 
sex education, homosexuality and similar. In France, for example, they organ-
ised an online petition against an animated film for primary schools entitled 
Baiser de la lune, which showed two male fish in love (Stambolis-Ruhstorfer & 
Tricou, 2017), while in Italy they succeeded in withdrawing books that address 
family diversity from some public primary schools (Garbagnoli, 2017).
In some countries, such as Poland and Croatia, where religious educa-
tion is an important part of the public school system and the Catholic Church 
has been an important actor within it, the anti-gender backlash can also be 
understood as a reaction to the interpretation that Church values and teaching 
about the complementarity of the sexes and the “natural family” are being ques-
tioned, and the role of the Church is being diminished (cf. Grabowska 2014).
Research into anti-gender campaigns in Europe (Kuhar & Paternotte, 
2017) has found three types of resistance against public schools, attempting ei-
ther to put pressure on school authorities and ministries of education to pro-
hibit certain topics from being discussed in schools, or to concretely intervene 
in the educational process itself. These types of resistances include: (1) general 
protests against sexual education, (2) denouncement of certain textbooks as 
promoting “gender ideology”, and (3) organised mass protests to keep children 
home from school.
The opposition to sex education in school is not new. Opponents claim 
that such education sexualises children at an early age and normalises homo-
sexuality, particularly in cases where sexuality is not presented only in a nega-
tive way (i.e., prevention of sexually transmitted diseases), but also in a positive 
way (i.e., enjoyment of sexuality). Furthermore, their efforts are based on the 
idea that children should be prevented from access to any kind of information 
on sexuality. It is believed that talking about sexuality would be detrimental to 
them, as children are understood as being without sexuality. Robinson (2008) 
points out that such “protection” makes children even more vulnerable, as they 
are prevented from access to relevant information about sexuality that would 
help them to become competent adults. 
One of the most visible examples of this is Croatia, where the Croatian 
anti-gender movement came into being precisely around the debates on health 
education (which includes a module on sex education), which started as early 
as in 2006. Besides the clash of the approaches to sex education – abstinence-
based programmes vs. holistic protection-based programmes – some claim 
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that sex education negatively affects pupils’ sexuality and increases teenage 
pregnancies (Bijelić 2008; Kuhar 2015). The most contentious issues in these 
debates, however, seem to be gender equality and positive representations of 
homosexuality (Hodžič & Štulhofer, 2017). 
Similar protests, organised by the anti-gender movement, can be seen 
in other European countries, too. In 2015 in Austria, the Initiative wertvolle 
Sexualerziehung (Initiative for Valuable Sexual Education), in close coopera-
tion with political parties and pro-life activists, organised a petition protesting 
against sex education and gender-sensitive language in Austrian schools (May-
er & Sauer, 2017). Demonstrations against sex education in school were also 
organised in Germany, where some groups promote homeschooling in order to 
avoid “gender theory” and to “weaken public (state driven) interference in what 
they consider ‘private’ matters” (Villa, 2007). Similarly, in Poland, sex education 
is presented as an unwanted intervention in the individual’s privacy and often 
compared to the previous political regime, which tried to gain full control over 
people’s private lives. A huge rally labelled “Stop Depravation in Education” was 
organised in 2015 to prevent changes in the existing sex education curricula 
(Graff & Korolczuk, 2017a).
The second type of protests are organised around the creation of epi-
sodes of moral panic, in which certain textbooks that address gender equality 
or promote analysis through gender lenses are scrutinised and accused of in-
doctrinating children in schools from an early age, usually without the knowl-
edge of parents. Such interventions are usually publicly declared by certain MPs 
who are close to the anti-gender movement, in order to put pressure on minis-
tries of education to prohibit these books in school.
Anti-gender groups also call on “concerned parents” to investigate text-
books and school curricula and identify where “gender ideology” has leaked 
into “our schools”. They are asked to report such examples to anti-gender 
groups, who then react by putting pressure on schools or a particular teacher 
to degender their teachings. In Italy, special “anti-gender phone lines” were in-
troduced by public authorities to enable parents to report instances of “gender 
ideology” found in education programmes (Garbargnoli, 2017).
One example of the “anti-gender examination of textbooks” is a Hungar-
ian history textbook that presents history through the lens of gender. A Fidesz 
MP denounced the textbook as promoting “gender ideology” during a parlia-
mentary debate (Kováts & Pető, 2017).
The French parliament saw identical concerns in 2011, when a con-
servative MP warned against the intention of the French Ministry of Educa-
tion to include the difference between sex and gender in high school biological 
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textbooks. This was seen as a penetration of foreign (i.e., American) theory into 
French textbooks, and as such was regarded as damaging for pupils (Stambolis-
Ruhstorfer & Tricou, 2017). 
In Slovenia, the booklet Ljubezen je ljubezen (Love is Love), which was 
used by Amnesty International during their extracurricular workshops in 
schools on human rights on the basis of “gender identity” and sexual orien-
tation, was discussed in parliament as evidence that “gender theory” is being 
spread among “our children in schools” without parents’ consent, and even 
without parents being informed. Pressure was put on the Minister of Educa-
tion to prevent the use of the booklet, which is, according to the anti-gender 
movement, “aimed at the re-education of children in accordance with ‘gender 
theory’, which does not recognise the existence of natural female and male sex-
es” (24kul, 2016). 
Similarly, in Poland, some anti-gender activists organised themselves 
around a protest against a handbook called Równościowe przedszkole (Equality 
Kindergarten), which is based on feminist ideas of gender equality. The handbook 
is interpreted as promoting masturbation, while sex educators are rumoured to 
force boys to wear dresses (Graff & Korolczuk, 2017). Much like in Slovenia, the 
handbook is seen as evidence of a plan to destroy innocent children, who are to 
be confused about gender roles at an early age (Korolczuk, 2014). 
Finally, in addition to (online) petitions and public protests against ad-
dressing diversity and gender equality in schools and textbooks, anti-gender 
activists have also organised concrete actions that have interfered with the edu-
cational process itself. In 2014, the French anti-gender movement organised 
the action Journée de Retrait de l’École (Keep Your Child Home from School 
Day) in order to protest against the Ministry of Education and its intention 
to introduce an experimental curriculum on gender equality in schools. They 
used social media to call on parents – particularly in working class families of 
colour – not to allow their children to go to school. This created a kind of moral 
panic and some pupils stayed at home for several days (Stambolis-Ruhstorfer 
& Tricou, 2017).
Inspired by the French protests, the Italian anti-gender movement or-
ganised a similar action in 2014. Using WhatsApp and other social media, the 
Italian Association of Catholic School Parents called on parents to withdraw 
their children from public schools once a month in order to protest against 
colonisation by “gender ideology” in Italian schools (Garbargnoli, 2017).
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The rights of parents and the educational process
The increasing anti-gender resistance targeting of public schools ex-
ceeds previous occasional protests by some parents who wanted their particular 
value system to be installed in public school curricula. The magnitude of the 
resistance, and particularly the convergence of resisting anti-gender strategies 
across Europe, inevitably gives rise to the question of how to reconcile the spe-
cific and particular value system of some parents (and their children) and the 
educational process in public schools. 
We assume that this question can be answered by an evaluation of the ex-
isting court rulings of the European Court on Human Rights, which has previ-
ously dealt with similar examples of parents who have tried to prevent – or have 
even successfully prevented – their children from attending school due to their 
particular value system, despite the fact that the anti-gender movement is gener-
ally aiming at the exclusion of some topics for all pupils, not just for their own.
Our starting point is the Resolution on the European dimension of educa-
tion: teaming and curriculum content (1991), which stipulates that human rights, 
plural democracy, tolerance, solidarity and rule of law are the most basic values 
enabling human coexistence. This means that this framework, particularly the 
human rights framework, should be the most general and basic framework of 
the public education system in Europe, or generally in a postmodern society, 
which is characterised by the co-existence of different value and belief systems, 
but which must welcome all pupils in public schools equally.
As demonstrated by Lefort (2001), human rights do not determine and 
define the concrete form of an “ideal life”; on the contrary, they represent one of 
the conditions for coexistence in postmodern diversity. The answer to the ques-
tion, what is “the ideal life” is therefore left to be determined by each individual 
him/herself.  
The adoption of human rights is a prerequisite for the coexistence of 
particularities in our value systems, whereby it should be noted that the pre-
dominant value system is still a particular one. For example, even if, in a given 
society, there is a perception of the “ideal life” that is accepted by the major-
ity, this idea cannot be understood as applying to all, despite the fact that it is 
supported by the majority. In short, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
concept of particular, which includes some majority beliefs and values, and the 
concept of common, which we all share and is defined as such by international 
treaties, resolutions and legislation, such as those pertaining to human rights. 
This is precisely the key distinction established by the idea of human 
rights. Once we adopt it as a common basis, it creates a legitimate distinction 
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between what is understood as common and what is particular. Such a dis-
tinction is also a helpful tool enabling teachers and school authorities to make 
decisions in the context of conflicts rooted in values and morals, such as that 
initiated by the anti-gender movement. Since one of the basic human rights is 
the principle of non-discrimination, irrespective of any personal circumstanc-
es, human rights demand tolerance and respect for diversity. This means that 
teachers are required to provide information and knowledge that is based on 
scientific findings, while at the same time striving for the implementation of 
the principle of non-discrimination and respect for diversity, even if this results 
in some pupils being “morally distressed” by new information or knowledge 
(Kovač Šebart & Krek, 2009).
In the past, some parents appealed to the European Court of Human 
Rights, claiming that their right to education, as defined by Article 2 of the Pro-
tocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1952), had been infringed: “No person shall be denied the right to 
education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to edu-
cation and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophi-
cal convictions.”
But what exactly does this provision mean for public schools in Europe? 
Does it mean that the State is required to provide education that is in line with 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions? 
The most important ruling in this context is the case of Kjeldsen, Busk 
Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark from 1976. In 1970, Denmark introduced 
compulsory sex education in order to “reduce the increased prevalence of un-
wanted pregnancies and promote respect for others”. Some parents, including 
the complainants, believed that compulsory sex education was not in accord-
ance with their Christian beliefs. “They considered that sex education raised 
moral questions and so preferred to instruct their children in this sphere. They 
petitioned on multiple occasions to get their children exempted from sex edu-
cation. However these requests were not met, resulting in some of the appli-
cants withdrawing their children from their respective State schools” (Right to 
Education Project, 2013).
In a more recent case – Willi, Anna and David Dojan v. Germany and 
four other applications – the applicants (members of the Christian Evangelical 
Baptist Church) requested that their children should be exempted from sex ed-
ucation, which is part of the curricula of primary school. The applicants stated 
that their children “had been used to modest and chaste sexual behaviour at 
home and did thus not have the necessary maturity to receive the envisaged sex 
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education”, which would lead to the “premature sexualisation” of the children 
(ECHR, 2011). A couple of years later, the applicants prevented some of their 
children from attending a school theatre workshop entitled “My Body is Mine”, 
which was organised for the purpose of preventing sexual abuse. Parents stated 
“that it was incompatible with their religious convictions to make a child’s own 
feelings and will the basis of his or her sexual behaviour, as this would encour-
age them to act according to their sexual desire like an adult, lose their sense of 
shame and engage in sexual acts with adults. The biblical doctrine of chastity, 
limiting sexuality to matrimony, constituted sufficient protection against sexual 
abuse” (ibid.).
In both cases described above, the European Court of Human Rights 
came to the same conclusion. The Court ruled that compulsory sex education 
in public schools as such does not violate parental freedom to educate their 
children according to their religious and philosophical convictions. In the latter 
case, it reiterated that Article 2 of the Protocol “aims at safeguarding the possi-
bility of pluralism in education, a possibility which is essential for the preserva-
tion of the ‘democratic society’ as conceived by the Convention” (ibid.). Article 
2 as a whole does not prevent States from disseminating objective information 
“for otherwise all institutionalised teaching would run the risk of proving im-
practicable” because “it seems very difficult for many subjects taught at school 
not to have […] some philosophical complexion or implications” (ibid.). How-
ever, the knowledge must be conveyed in an “objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner”, without pursuing the aim of indoctrination. The Court also stated 
that the applicants “were free to educate their children after school and at week-
ends and thus their right to educate their children in conformity with their 
religious convictions was not restricted in a disproportionate manner” (ibid.). 
Both rulings stipulate that parents do not have the right to prevent those 
issues that might be in conflict with their personal beliefs from being discussed 
in schools: “The Convention does not guarantee the right not to be confronted 
with opinions that are opposed to one’s own convictions” (ibid.). Identical court 
decisions were ruled in many other similar cases, as well (Appel-Irrgang and 
others v. Germany, 2009; Folgero and others v. Germany, 2007; Hasan and Ey-
lem Zengin v. Turkey, 2007).
Another decision of the European Court of Human Rights from 1982 (X. 
and Y. v. the UK) is also important in this context. In this case, the complain-
ants claimed that the State should financially support a private school (Waldorf 
school) that they had chosen due to their personal philosophical convictions. 
The court decision stipulates that the State is not obliged to either found or 
finance private schools that serve particular religious or philosophical beliefs. 
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Public schools must, however, respect the particular beliefs of parents. Accord-
ing to the interpretation of the European Court, the latter means that public 
schools may not indoctrinate children contrary to the beliefs of their parents; at 
the same time, the educational process must comply with the principles of criti-
cism, objectivity and pluralism. Following this judgment, particular religious 
or philosophical beliefs must be respected in public schools, but that certainly 
does not mean that the educational concept of public schools should follow the 
particular belief systems of (some) parents (Cf. Kodelja 1995; Kovač Šebart 2015; 
Kovač Šebart & Kuhar, 2017).
Conclusion
According to the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
“moral distress” experienced by some pupils when faced with topics such as 
gender equality or homosexuality does not mean that the teaching of such top-
ics in public schools is in violation of Article 2 of the Protocol to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, nor 
does it mean that public schools should avoid dealing with issues that have a 
philosophical or religious foundation. Pupils can be confronted with facts and 
opinions that differ from their beliefs (and as a rule this inevitably happens) 
and teachers should not avoid such topics; they should, however, respect the 
diversity of beliefs in school.
There is another reason why “morally controversial” topics should not 
be avoided. If the fundamental educational goals of public schools are appar-
ent from the European Convention on Human Rights (1994), which establishes 
pluralistic democratic society and respect for diversity as an ideal, avoidance of 
“morally controversial” topics may be in direct conflict with this objective. If 
teachers avoid these topics, pluralism is turned into nothing more than “mon-
ism”. The “moral shock” that may follow confrontation with facts that oppose 
one’s own particular beliefs is precisely the ground on which it is possible to 
pursue the objective of tolerance for diversity and life in a pluralistic demo-
cratic society. In other words, “moral distress” leads to an awareness of one’s 
own particularity in relation to another particularity.
Following the European Court of Justice’s rulings, the aim of public 
education should not be indoctrination, but rather the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge that can ultimately also lead to a change in beliefs. 
The rulings presented in the present article provide clear instructions 
regarding the role of public schools and teachers in the context of particular 
religious and philosophical convictions. As the public educational process must 
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be based on the framework of human rights and respect for diversity, the anti-
gender movement should prove that gender equality is an infringement of the 
idea of equal human rights. Furthermore, it should prove that understanding 
gender as socially constructed is a false and non-scientific approach to social 
roles and identities based in gender, as public schools are obliged to base their 
educational process on scientific findings. It comes as no surprise, therefore, 
that in many ways – as we have shown in the present article – the anti-gen-
der movement is a struggle over the legitimacy of academic work and – in the 
populist world of “alternative facts” – an attempt to create “alternative science”. 
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